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Is there such a thing as “modern” Imperialism?  Does it have any common characteristics?  
What distinguishes it from the Ancient Empires of Persia, Greece or China, or from the 
medieval and early-modern Empires of the Mongols and Ottomans?  Can we speak of a 
common form of “European” Imperialism emerging in the 19th century, as Europe’s 
growing fiscal, military and technological superiority over the rest of the world was 
transmuted into commercial and territorial domination?  These are all broad theoretical 
questions which have long exercised the minds of historians of empire. On one level they 
are unanswerable: there is no universally-accepted definition of either “empire” or 
“modernity,” but like many concepts which provoke acres of sterile semantic debate, we 
generally know them when we see them.1 The classic Weberian idea of modernity has it 
originating in Europe, and associates it with (amongst other things) industrialisation, 
urbanisation, bureaucratisation, secularisation, the simultaneous rise of individualism and 
state power, and the overall “disenchantment” of the human race as it turns from magic to 
rationality.2 To this E. P. Thompson added the accurate measurement of time, making 
possible industrial discipline, “working hours” and common temporal awareness.3 Benedict 
Anderson’s notion of the modern Nation-State as an “Imagined Community” also includes 
shared time, the linking together of people who do not know each other and are in widely 
                                                        
 This paper was originally written for a Panel on “Empire in Modernity: A Comparative 
Perspective” organised by Professor Tomohiko Uyama at the First Congress of the Asian 
Association of World Historians in Osaka on 29th–31st May 2009. It is intended as a “thought” 
piece, and as such I have not updated it substantially since then. My thanks to Shigeru Akita, 
Jun Furuya, Tomohiko Uyama, Thomas Welsford and Yoichi Kibata for their comments 
beforehand and at the conference.  
1 A stimulating discussion of “empire” is to be found in Dominic Lieven, “Empire: A Word and 
its Meanings,” Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals (London, 2000), pp. 1–26; on the 
vagueness and changing meanings of “modernity,” see Michael Saler, “Modernity and 
Enchantment: A Historiographic Review,” American Historical Review 111, no. 3 (2006), pp. 
692–716.  
2 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford, 1946).  
3 E. P. Thompson, “Time, Work Discipline and Industrial Capitalism,” Past & Present 38 
(1967), pp. 56–97.  
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separated places at particular moments of “national” significance, and the end of any 
feeling of “simultaneity” with past events.4 These are just a few of the most commonly-
invoked markers of “modernity.”  
Over the last thirty years historians have mounted a sustained critique of the 
Weberian model. Some do this from a postcolonial perspective, claiming it is Eurocentric 
and implicitly endorses colonialism. Others simply point to the gaping holes in Weber’s 
paradigm, not least the great religious revivals of 19th-century Europe and 20th-century 
America, and the widespread failure of most of the world to industrialise and embrace 
rational individualism. As with many such theories it is perhaps too early to say if they 
represent a correct prediction of the trajectory of social evolution, but amidst the murk 
certain important ideas have emerged: firstly, most of humanity has not yet become 
“modern,” and (some would argue) will never do so, whilst most of those who have find 
that modern and pre-modern elements can co-exist, often quite comfortably, within a single 
individual’s identity; secondly, and similarly, modernity seems to exist in pockets dotted 
around the world, rather than coinciding neatly with notional “civilizational” boundaries; 
thirdly, Europe did not have a monopoly on its origins; fourthly, historians can now speak 
of the emergence of “multiple modernities,” which share some characteristics (such as 
urbanisation and common temporal awareness) but not others (such as secularisation and 
industrialisation) emerging at different times in different places around the globe. Sheldon 
Pollock has repeatedly urged historians to be cautious in assuming the lack of modernity, 
or of any capacity for developing it, within pre-colonial societies such as India before the 
mid-18th century.5 As David Washbrook has shown, the industrial revolution in Britain, 
that defining moment in Europe’s “invention” of modernity, was based upon the 
manufacture of cotton textiles in order to compete with Indian innovation and 
manufacturing capacity: it cannot be understood simply as a European phenomenon.6 
Similarly, China was a highly bureaucratised society with institutions (such as competitive 
examinations for entry to the civil service) which have long been considered characteristic 
of “European modernity” hundreds of years before such things were ever thought of in 
                                                        
4  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism (London, 1999), pp. 22–24.  
5  Sheldon Pollock, “Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern South Asia: Introduction,” 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24, no. 2 (2004), pp. 19–21.  
6 David Washbrook, “From Comparative Sociology to Global History: Britain and India in the 
Pre-History of Modernity,” Journal of the Economic & Social History of the Orient 40, no. 4 
(1997), pp. 410–443.  
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Europe.7  The destruction of the concept of “modernity” is far from complete: certain 
phenomena associated with it, notably time-keeping and industrialisation, are too real and 
too important in recent history to disappear entirely at the wave of a post-modern wand. 
Washbrook also suggests that a certain type of “modern” Imperialism can also be identified, 
and that it emanates from the West.8 It is this idea which I would like to pursue further: in 
my view the implications of these arguments for the distinction made between “modern” 
and “pre-modern” empires have not been sufficiently thought through.  
When historians use such categories as “modern European empires” or “European 
colonialism” they normally have a certain Imperial archetype in mind. It will be a maritime 
empire with a clear distinction between metropole and colony, visible in cultural, linguistic 
and ethnic terms and enshrined legally; it would be acquired by conquest or commercial 
penetration, and held by force. Many historians would also assert, following J. A. Hobson, 
V. I. Lenin and, more recently, P. J. Cain & A. G. Hopkins, that it has a particularly close 
relationship with finance and industrial capitalism. 9  It will have some notion of a 
“civilising mission,” and employ this and other Enlightenment discourses to legitimate its 
rule. It will have varying hierarchies of political rights based largely on race, and at its 
heart will lie a nation-state,10 in the name of whose privileged titular nationality all these 
territories will be held; all of this then contributes to a clear and insuperable barrier 
between ruling and subject peoples; indeed this entire model of empire is based upon ideas 
of difference, clear boundaries and demarcations, however difficult these often were to 
uphold in practice in the face of 19th-century ideas about universal human political rights.11 
The most common archetypes invoked are the British and French empires, but the German, 
                                                        
7 Mark Elvin, “A Working Definition of Modernity?” Past & Present 113 (1986), pp. 209–216.  
8 Washbrook, “From Comparative Sociology,” p. 417.  
9 J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: a Study (London, 1902); V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage 
of Capitalism (Moscow, 1982); P. J. Cain & A. G. Hopkins, “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British 
Expansion Overseas: I. The Old Colonial System, 1688–1850,” Economic History Review 39, no. 
4 (1986), pp. 501–525; idem, “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas: II. New 
Imperialism, 1850–1945,” Economic History Review 40, no.1 (1987), pp. 1–26.  
10 Peter Van der Veer suggests that the nation state with its internal and external colonising 
projects that seek to remake subjects and citizens and erase their “backwardness” is itself a 
defining phenomenon of “modernity,” although Washbrook points out that he overlooks the 
anti-enlightenment, romantic heritage of the nation-state. See Peter Van Der Veer, “The Global 
History of ‘Modernity’  ” & David Washbrook, “The Global History of ‘Modernity’: A 
Response to a Reply,” Journal of the Economic & Social History of the Orient 41, no. 3 (1998), 
pp. 289, 305.  
11 Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a 
Research Agenda,” in idem, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World 
(Berkeley, 1997), pp. 1–56.  
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Belgian and Dutch overseas empires all fall clearly enough into this pattern. The Japanese 
empire in China and South-East Asia, which shared most of these characteristics, is also 
commonly placed in this category, as an example of imitative or “neo-European” 
Imperialism.12 The Spanish and Portuguese empires, despite clearly being European, are 
often omitted from consideration as being mere relics of much greater early-modern 
Empires. The Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires, despite unquestionably 
existing in the period of modernity, are often left out on the grounds that they were land-
based, dynastic agglomerations, and in the case of the latter two only very marginally 
“European.”13 
 The inconsistencies of these categorisations are endless; they both obscure the 
differences between different types of “modern, European imperialism” and the similarities 
between these and “Asiatic” or “pre-modern” empires. As John Darwin has recently 
suggested, the emergence of European hegemony in Asia cannot be understood without 
reference to the great early-modern Islamic Empires of the Ottomans, Mughals and 
Safavids, whose emergence was almost contemporaneous with the first stirrings of 
Portuguese, British and Dutch Imperialism, and which until the early 18th century were 
more than holding their own against them.14 That other great early-modern Empire, Qing 
China, survives to this day under a different political guise, and retains the colonial 
peripheries of Turkestan and Tibet which it conquered in the 17th and 18th centuries, where 
it pursues a policy of railway construction and mass colonisation highly reminiscent of 
19th-century European Imperialism.  
Historians have also long been aware of the many differences between different 
European colonial powers, even if at times they conflated the intentions and outcomes of 
Imperial policies. Henri Brunschwig famously argued that British Imperialism was 
motivated largely by hard-headed commercial and strategic concerns, whilst France’s was 
an often irrational outgrowth of thwarted nationalism in the aftermath of the Napoleonic 
and Franco-Prussian wars.15 France proudly proclaimed her “mission civilisatrice,” and 
                                                        
12 See, however the rather more subtle and wide-ranging discussion of the place of Japanese 
Imperialism amongst the European Empires in W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894–
1945 (Oxford, 1987), pp.1–13.  
13 D. K. Fieldhouse, for instance, does include Russia (but not Japan or the Ottoman Empire) in 
his survey of colonial empires, but is clearly irritated at having to do so and confines his 
attention to Turkestan. The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth 
Century (New York, 1966), pp. 325, 334–341.  
14 John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire (London, 2006).  
15 Henri Brunschwig, French Colonialism 1871–1914: Myths and Realities (London, 1966), pp. 
20–30, 182–186.  
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through protective tariffs and cultural Imperialism sought to create islands of Frenchness 
around the world. The British were free-trading, usually very distrustful of evidence of 
Anglicisation amongst their subject peoples, and the great centres of their empire were 
cosmopolitan entrepôts such as Alexandria, Bombay, or Singapore, the “plural societies” 
identified in J. S. Furnivall’s pioneering work.16 In practice, of course, this distinction was 
often blurred: Britain’s self-governing white settler dominions were mostly protectionist as 
well, the cultural (and particularly the sporting) legacy which the British empire left behind 
in Africa and Asia was every bit as profound as that of the French, whilst Algiers was no 
less cosmopolitan than Rangoon.17 However the rhetoric (and perhaps the aims) of Empire 
were often rather different, and furthermore Britain was a monarchy, with the crown at the 
heart of the whole Imperial system, whilst in France for most of the 19th century (and 
certainly at the time when Imperial expansion was at its height, under the Third Republic) 
the people were, in theory, sovereign. For outsiders, at least, Britain was defined by her 
Empire, however little attention the British may have paid to it domestically: it was what 
made her a great power.18 For the Germans, though, their colonial empire was arguably 
little more than a set of bargaining chips to be played on the diplomatic tables of Europe.19 
The Dutch, meanwhile, never even used their own language in governing the East Indies, 
employing instead a Malay lingua franca which subsequently became Bahasa Indonesia, 
meaning that their cultural legacy in this respect was minimal. Most obviously, perhaps, the 
general category of “European Imperialism” elides the vital distinction between settler and 
non-settler colonies, something of far greater importance than the approach or policies of 
any particular country. 
So, amongst the 19th-century empires, does one stand out as being more different 
from all the rest than they all are from each other?  Russia would be the example put 
forward most frequently: here was a great, land-based empire, with its roots in the early-
modern period, whose titular nationality was ill-defined and enjoyed no particular 
privileges, whose ruling elite was cosmopolitan, with a disproportionate role played by 
non-Russians, in particular Poles, Baltic Germans and Georgians, and which had at its heart 
                                                        
16  J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and 
Netherlands India (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 117–123.  
17 See for instance the gloriously Orientalist imagining of Algiers by the popular 19th-century 
novelist Ouida in Under Two Flags (London, 1863).   
18 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain 
(Oxford, 2004), pp. 1–24.  
19 The classic expression of this argument is A. J. P. Taylor, Germany’s First Bid for Colonies 
1884‒1885: A Move in Bismarck’s European Policy (London, 1938), pp. 1–15.  
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not a nation, but an arguably alien ruling dynasty. Mediaeval Muscovy expanded into 
contiguous territories, many of them sparsely populated, and some Russian historians argue 
that it ought really to be seen as the heir to the Mongol Empire.20 With leading noble 
families such as the Stroganovs and Yusupovs descended from Muslim Tatars, with 
colonists in Siberia “going native” rather than the natives becoming russified,21  racial 
boundaries seem blurred. Class or Soslovie, not race, was what determined hierarchies in 
Russia. Above all, where is that vital distinction between metropole and colony, that barrier 
between the political, cultural and territorial “nation” at the heart of Empire, and the 
colonies at the periphery?  Russia’s identity is said to be inseparable from Empire, her 
nationalism warped and weakened by it, her people even described as the chief victims of 
“their” empire by some historians.22 Even today one cannot really isolate “Russia” on a 
map: the rump of the Russian federation which was left behind after the break-up of the 
USSR, with its Far Eastern and Siberian territories and its patchwork of “autonomous” 
oblasts for different nationalities, is very far from being a nation-state. All of this would 
suggest that if Russia belongs in any “category,” it is that of the early-modern dynastic 
empires which survived into the modern period, those of the Habsburgs and the Ottomans: 
certainly some influential cultural historians have argued that to equate Russian 
Imperialism with that of the British or French is problematic and inaccurate.23 
Russia certainly was distinctive: but this is a relative, not an absolute judgement. 
Was she more distinct from the French and British empires than they were from each other?  
If so, by how much?  Several of the points made above about Russia could also be made 
(sometimes with tongue firmly in cheek) about the British empire, where David Cannadine 
has emphasised the vital role of the (German) royal family and monarch as the keystone of 
the Imperial hierarchy, binding together Indian Princes, the emirs of Northern Nigeria and 
the Sheikhs of the Gulf protectorates in an Imperial version of the “great chain of being.” 
The rituals surrounding the proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India, and the 
neo-mediaeval “feudalism” of Lord Lytton’s great Imperial Durbar of 1877 epitomise this 
                                                        
20 Sergei Panarin, Dmitrii Raevskii, “Predislovie,” in Evraziya, Lyudi i Mify (Moscow, 2003), p. 
11.  
21 See Willard Sunderland, “Russians into Iakuts? ‘Going Native’ and Problems of Russian 
National Identity in the Siberian North, 1870s–1914,” Slavic Review 55, no. 4 (1996), pp.806–
825.  
22 Austin Jersild, “ ‘Russia,’ from the Vistula to the Terek to the Amur,” Kritika: Explorations 
in Russian and Eurasian History 1, no. 3 (2000), pp. 531–546; Geoffrey Hosking, Russia, 
People and Empire (London, 1997).  
23  Hosking, Russia, People and Empire, pp. 39–40; Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: A 
Cultural History of Russia (London, 2002), pp. 381–382.  
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vision of Imperial hierarchy, which was every bit as monarchical and class-based as 
anything which existed in Russia.24 Lord Liverpool, British prime minister from 1812–
1828, had a Gujarati grandmother, and a good deal of cultural exchange and racial 
mingling between East and West took place in the British and French Empires, even if 
from the mid-eighteenth century this was on strictly unequal terms and boundaries had 
hardened by the 1830s.25 Field Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar, the British commander 
in the 2nd Afghan and Boer Wars, had an Indian grandmother and stepmother. Class was 
sometimes as important as race in determining British imperial hierarchies, meaning that 
Indian princes could attend elite schools and universities and gain admission to exclusive 
clubs which no white working-class male could dream of entering; that the first Indian 
member of Parliament at Westminster was elected in 1892;26 whilst in the 1890s K.S. 
Ranjitsinhji could not merely play cricket for Cambridge and England, but also captain 
Sussex County Cricket Club and have white Britons under his authority.27 Certainly there 
was a much more obvious metropole at the heart of the British Empire, but the huge 
variations in rights accorded to British subjects across the empire and within Britain itself 
helped to blur this distinction somewhat.28 The “metropole” was divided between four 
different nations, at least one of which, the Irish, could claim to have been colonised by 
England. At the same time the Scots and Irish if anything played a more important role 
within the Imperial ruling elite than the English themselves. Not for nothing was it called 
the “British Empire,” but if a British nationality ever existed then it was an Imperial one 
which arguably has not survived the loss of empire.29  
Perhaps, then, we should be looking at Britain as the Imperial odd man out, rather 
than an Imperial archetype?  Britain’s empire contained a great sub-Imperial metropole in 
India, a land-based empire in itself, which, as has been rightly observed by Douglas Peers, 
                                                        
24 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (London, 2001), pp. 
9–10, 101–120.  
25  See William Dalrymple, White Mughals (London, 2003), esp. pp. 31–32 on Sir David 
Ouchterlony who was British resident at Delhi in the 1830s, and supposedly provided each of 
his thirteen Indian wives with her own elephant!  
26 Dadabhai Naoroji, Liberal MP for Finsbury and a prominent Indian Nationalist. 
27 See Cannadine, Ornamentalism; Kenneth Ballhatchet, Race, Sex and Class under the Raj 
(London, 1980).  
28 David Washbrook, “…And Having Melted into Thin Air, Then Rains Down Again,” Journal 
of the Economic & Social History of the Orient 42, no. 4 (1999), p. 570.  
29 For a polemical treatment of this question from a Scottish Nationalist perspective, see Tom 
Nairn, After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland (London, 2000), pp. 39–46, and 
from a right-wing “English” perspective, Simon Heffer, “A Crisis of Identity,” in idem, Nor 
Shall My Sword: The Reinvention of England (London, 1999), pp. 1–57.  
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until at least the mid-19th-century was a military-fiscal garrison-state, dependent on 
agrarian tribute, rather than on industrial capitalist production or exploitation. Acquiring 
territory (and therefore land revenue), controlling labour and funding a locally-raised army 
were the principal aims of the state in British India during the period 1750–1860, not 
opening up the country to trade and investment.30  Perhaps British India had more in 
common not only with the early-modern Islamic “gunpowder empires,” but also with 
Russia, than is often supposed. India was at once anomalous and absolutely central to the 
whole structure of British Imperialism as it emerged. It had no exact equivalent in any 
other European Empire: the closest would be French Algeria, but this was a settler colony 
with a fraction of the population, was merely a short hop across the Mediterranean, and 
administratively a part of the metropole. This in turn leads one to question the assumption 
that maritime empires are necessarily more divided by distance than land-based ones. In the 
1870s, when it took two weeks to sail from Southampton to Bombay, and a matter of hours 
from Marseille to Algiers, it took two to three months for a caravan to travel between the 
frontier town of Orenburg and the capital of Russian Turkestan, Tashkent. The role played 
by the sea as an imaginative and cultural frontier is certainly important (though arguably no 
more important than that played by the “Prostor” of the Eurasian Steppe, which separated 
European Russia from its Central Asian colonies). However, before the railway age, the sea 
was the world’s main highway, a means of rapid communication rather than a barrier. The 
Empires of Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, like Russia’s, all had their 
roots in the early-modern period; in some cases they had expanded into more or less 
contiguous areas with which they had a long historical relationship (Algeria and West 
Africa in the French case, Ireland in the case of the British, and, if we look back even 
further, the Spanish reconquista of Andalusia which was a prelude to expansion in the 
Americas). In some cases they also succeeded earlier Imperial polities, most obviously the 
Mughals in India (where Bombay was also acquired by the British through inter-dynastic 
marriage). None of this amounts to saying that these empires were the same as Russia’s, 
but they certainly suggest that the differences are those of degree, not of kind. 
All of this suggests that the comparison of ostensibly very different “types” of 
empire is far from a futile exercise, that it can yield as many and as rich and unexpected 
insights as the much-vaunted “interdisciplinary” approach to history. Whilst the application 
of theoretical insights developed in the study of one empire to the understanding of another 
                                                        
30 Douglas Peers, “Gunpowder Empires and the Garrison State: Modernity, Hybridity, and the 
Political Economy of Colonial India, circa 1750–1860,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 2 (2007), pp. 245–258.  
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is relatively common,31 sustained empirical comparison between empires is still rare.32 In 
my own work I have looked at British India and Russian Turkestan (specifically the region 
of Samarkand), and the similarities and differences which I found were not necessarily 
those one would expect. 33  In both cases the military played a prominent role in 
administration, often without having received any appropriate education or training. Both 
the Russians in Turkestan and the British in India had difficulty in gaining accurate 
information about newly-conquered territories, and relied heavily on local agents and 
intermediaries. The nature of these intermediaries was often rather different, however, as 
Russian rule was markedly more anti-aristocratic than that of the British in India. Here, 
before 1857, the British had pursued an inconsistent policy, both creating a class of 
landowning Zamindars in Bengal in the 1790s and entrusting them with the collection of 
land revenue,34 and also expropriating the Taluqdars of Oudh in 1856.35 However after the 
Rebellion of 1857, which was widely attributed to the social unrest caused by anti-
aristocratic policies,36 the British generally sought to rule through local princes, tribal and 
religious leaders and landowning elites, appropriating their pre-existing legitimacy and 
                                                        
31  Benedict Anderson’s ideas about print capitalism and national identity were originally 
developed in the course of his studies of the Dutch East Indies, but have of course achieved 
near-universal significance for historians, whilst the writings of the “Subaltern Studies” 
collective of historians of South Asia have had an influence well beyond their geographical 
sphere. For a recent example of the application of postcolonial theory to Russian Imperialism, 
see Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent (Bloomington, IN, 2007).  
32 Amongst the most interesting recent examples of such a comparative approach are Beate 
Eschment and Hans Harder, eds., Looking at the Coloniser: Cross-Cultural Perceptions in 
Central Asia, the Caucasus, Bengal and Related Areas (Würzburg, 2004); Dina Khoury and 
Dane Kennedy, “Comparing Empires: The Ottoman Domains and the British Raj in the Long 
Nineteenth Century,” the introduction to a special issue of Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 2 (2007). It is noticeable however that both collections 
consist almost entirely of essays that sit alongside each other, leaving the reader to make 
comparisons, rather than the authors seeking to make comparisons themselves. The exception 
(characteristically) in the latter is C. A. Bayly, “Distorted Development: The Ottoman Empire 
and British India, circa 1780–1916,” pp.332–344, although this spends more time looking at the 
connections between the two rather than comparing systems of Imperial rule. Most recently, we 
now have a sweeping comparative survey by Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in 
World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ, 2010) 
33 See A. S. Morrison, Russian Rule in Samarkand 1868–1910: A Comparison with British 
India  (Oxford, 2008).  
34 P. J. Marshall, Bengal: The British Bridgehead: Eastern India 1740–1828 (Cambridge, 1987), 
pp. 122–127, 139–144. See also Anand Yang, The Limited Raj (Delhi, 1989).  
35 Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, The Taluqdari Settlement in Oudh (Delhi, 1985) (1882), p. 4; Iltudus 
Prichard, The Administration of India from 1859 to 1868 (London, 1869), pp. 21–27.  
36 See Thomas R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India 1857–1870 (Princeton, NJ, 1964). 
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seeking to buy their loyalty with land-grants and tax-breaks.37 By contrast, in the mid-19th 
century the Russians abandoned their previous Imperial policy of assimilating the 
aristocracies of conquered regions (seen most obviously in the case of the Tatar and 
Georgian nobility). The reasons for this were complicated, but had a great deal to do with 
the growing suspicion of Islam engendered by the long-running war in the North Caucasus, 
where this change of policy first became visible.38 After they conquered the settled regions 
of Central Asia in 1865–72, the Russians expropriated or attempted to marginalise the Beks, 
Amlakdars and Khoja lineages of pre-conquest Turkestan and sought to replace them with 
a local administration whose members would be entirely dependent on the colonial power 
for their authority.39 The background of the men who came to fill posts in the so-called 
“native administration” (Tuzemnaya Administratsiya) – Volostnoi Upravitel', Aksakal, 
Aryk-Aksakal or indeed Qazi40 – is not always clear. Many may have belonged to precisely 
the landowning and religious elite (Khoja) groups of which the Russians were suspicious: 
but the intention was certainly very different.  
Both powers found it very difficult to manage pre-existing systems of irrigation 
owing to a lack of detailed knowledge, and were forced to devolve the vital business of 
water distribution to local agents. However the implications of this were much more 
serious for the Russians in Turkestan than they were for the British in Punjab, because in 
the former territory almost all artificial irrigation pre-dated the conquest, whilst in the latter 
the British had built most of the canals themselves. The policies towards Islamic law of the 
two powers also differed, with the Russians preserving (albeit altering) the Qazis courts, 
the British abolishing them and instead incorporating an elaborate structure of “Anglo-
Muhammadan Law” into their penal code in India. It is interesting, though, that one of the 
unfulfilled aims of Count Konstantin Pahlen’s 1908 reforming mission in Turkestan was to 
create a codified version of the Sharia, with Anglo-Muhammadan law as his model.41 
The Russians in Central Asia were not noticeably more racially and culturally 
                                                        
37 See for instance, Sarah Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 36–56.  
38 Austin Jersild, Orientalism and Empire (Montreal, 2002), pp. 32–33; Firouzeh Mostashari, 
On the Religious Frontier (London, 2006), pp. 83–84, chronicle the erosion of privileges and 
political power amongst, respectively, North Caucasian and Azeri aristocratic elites from the 
1830s onwards.  
39  Beks were regional governors under the Bukharan administration, Amlakdars were tax-
farmers, whilst Khojas claimed descent from the Prophet’s kin but were also representatives of 
major Sufi lineages, mostly Naqshbandi.  
40 Canton administrator; village elder; irrigation official; Islamic judge.  
41  See Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia 
(Berkeley, CA, 1997), pp. 70–71; Morrison, Russian Rule in Samarkand, pp. 274–282 for a 
discussion of this episode. 
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tolerant or assimilationist than the British. On the contrary they were if anything more 
hostile to and suspicious of Islam than the British were, with a paranoid fear of the 
“fanaticism” of the Sufi orders in particular engendered by their forty-year struggle in the 
North Caucasus.42 Their descriptions of the local population ranged from the derogatory to 
the patronising, but certainly never indicated that they viewed the Sarts, Tajiks, Uzbeks and 
Kirghiz of Central Asia as equals, or indulged in ideas of pan-Asian “kinship.” It is 
probable that biological racism was less widespread and influential in the Russian empire 
than in the British, but it was by no means unknown, and in any case this was only one of 
many markers of the difference and inferiority of subject peoples, racial, religious and 
cultural, which the Russians and other Europeans employed.43 Russia may not have had as 
clear a distinction between metropole and periphery as the British Empire, but there was an 
idea of what constituted Korennaya Rus, and this was reflected administratively in the 
distinction between areas under civilian and under military rule, those in which the liberal 
reforms of the 1860s were applied, and those where they were withheld: between Zemstvo 
and non-Zemstvo provinces, and between those which enjoyed the independent civilian 
courts and legal code of 1864, and those which did not.44 There was no single concept of 
Russian Imperial “citizenship,”45 any more than there was in the British empire, and all the 
evidence of the last years of Tsarism suggests that in Russia’s fledgling democratic culture 
the enjoyment of political rights and “Europeanness” (if not Russianness) were becoming 
increasingly closely aligned. Thus the franchises for the Municipal Dumas in Baku and 
Tashkent were heavily skewed in favour of European settlers, whilst Turkestan’s 
representation in the Duma was removed altogether after 1907.46 The events of 1916–17 in 
Turkestan saw an all-out ethnic war, and a land-grab by Russian settlers. Subsequently 
under the guise of “Bolshevism” they attempted to appropriate the power of the Imperial 
                                                        
42 See further Alexander Knysh “Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm,” Die Welt des Islams 42, 
no. 2 (2002), pp. 139–173.  
43 N. A. Riasanovsky, “Asia through Russian Eyes,” in W. S. Vucinich, ed., Russia and Asia 
(Stanford, 1972), pp. 3–29; Alexander Morrison, “Russian Rule in Turkestan and the Example 
of British India,” Slavonic & East European Review 84, no. 4 (2006), pp.706–707; Sahadeo, 
Russian Colonial Society, p. 5.  
44  For a clear and incisive description of these administrative distinctions, see Kimitaka 
Matsuzato, “General-gubernatorstva v Rossiiskoi imperii: ot etnicheskogo k territorial'nomu 
podkhodu,” in I. Gerasimov, et al., eds., Novaya imperskaya istoriya postsovetskogo 
prostranstva (Kazan', 2004), pp. 456‒458.  
45 Alexander Morrison, “Metropole, Colony, and Imperial Citizenship in the Russian Empire,” 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 13, no. 2 (2012), pp. 329–366.  
46 Mostashari, On the Religious Frontier, pp. 69–70; Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society, pp. 83, 
94–95; Khalid, Muslim Cultural Reform, pp. 233–235.  
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state for themselves in order to preserve their privileged position, treating the local 
population with a brutality as extreme as anything seen in the Rif war or at Amritsar in 
1919.47 
So when it comes to the questions of cultural assimilation, racial and religious 
(in)tolerance, the “colonial” nature of the administration, violence and the distribution of 
political rights, what might seem key differences between British and Russian Imperialism 
turn out to be a good deal less stark than is commonly supposed. A different picture begins 
to emerge when comparing fiscal, economic and military policy. The British exploited 
India fiscally and militarily, using Indian revenues to fund an army that made Britain a 
world power on land as well as at sea, and which was used as an Imperial police force 
everywhere from China to Mesopotamia. By contrast the Russians lowered taxes after they 
conquered Turkestan, and proved very ineffective at collecting even those they imposed. 
Combined with their reluctance to recruit the local population into the army, the subsequent 
cost of the Russian garrison there meant that they ran a massive budget deficit in the region 
until at least 1905.48 This pattern was repeated elsewhere in the Russian borderlands, with 
only Poland making a substantial net contribution to the Imperial budget. Russia’s most 
“colonial” peripheries, Turkestan and the Caucasus, were both a substantial drain in 
budgetary terms.49 
Naturally the economic benefits of a colony to an empire cannot be understood 
purely in fiscal terms. The desire for a secure source of raw cotton for the Moscow textile 
industry when supplies were disrupted during the American Civil War is still frequently 
given as the main motivation for the conquest of Turkestan in the 1860s.50 But this cannot 
have provided the spur for a campaign which began in earnest in 1853 with the seizure of 
the Kokandian fortress of Aq-Masjid, and which would have come to an end much sooner 
had the Crimean War not intervened. By the time the Russians moved into the cotton-
growing oasis regions to the south of the Steppe after 1865 the American Civil War was 
                                                        
47 Adeeb Khalid, “Tashkent 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan,” Slavic Review 
55, no. 2 (1996), pp. 279–280; Marko Buttino, Revoliutsiya Naoborot (Moscow, 2007), pp. 58–
91, 172–206.  
48 From 1868–81 Turkestan ran a deficit which totalled 85,881,204 roubles – see F. K. Girs, 
Otchet, Revizuyushchago, po Vysochaishemu Poveleniyu, Turkestanskii Krai (St. Petersburg, 
1884), p. 366, and even in 1902 Government expenditure in the region exceeded income by 
over 10 million roubles – see V. V. Stratonov, “Dokhody i Raskhody Kazny,” Turkestanskii 
Kalendar' na 1904 g. (Tashkent, 1904), pp. 2–8. The figures in the Pahlen report of 1910 which 
show the beginnings of a surplus from 1905 are in my view suspect.  
49 Ekaterina Pravilova, “ ‘Tsena imperii’: tsentr i okrainy v rossiiskom biudzhete v XIX –
nachalo XX vv.,”  Ab Imperio 4 (2002), pp. 115–144.  
50 Marko Buttino, Revoliutsiya Naoborot (Moscow, 2007), p. 18.  
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over in any case. Whatever the motivation for the conquest however, the subsequent 
economic exploitation of the region as a captive market for Russian manufactured goods 
and a source of raw materials is normally assumed without question. The rapid expansion 
of cotton cultivation in Turkestan in the late Tsarist period saw exports soar from 873,000 
poods in 1888 to 13,697,000 poods in 1913 (which supplied about a half of the Empire’s 
needs),51 and a growing dependence on grain from European Russia. It foreshadowed the 
monoculture of the Soviet era, and is usually seen as fostering a classic “colonial” 
relationship of dependence and exploitation, the one aspect of Russian Imperialism which 
even Soviet historians felt comfortable comparing with the western Empires.52 Here the 
Moscow textile “barons” could play a similar Machiavellian role to Hobson’s Jewish 
financiers in South Africa, an argument which fitted snugly into official Marxism-Leninism, 
unsurprising given Lenin’s partial debt to Hobson.53 Western historians also accepted at 
face value the assumption of successful exploitation for Imperial benefit implicit in the 
much-quoted words of the Agriculture Minister A.V. Krivoshein “every excess pood of 
Turkestan wheat competes with Russian and Siberian wheat; every pood of Turkestan 
cotton competes with American cotton. Thus it is preferable to supply the region with 
imported though expensive grain and to free irrigated land for cotton.”54 There is certainly 
no doubt that by the early years of the 20th century, the Tsarist Government was seeking to 
exploit its peripheries and make them pay: that does not, however, necessarily mean that 
this central policy was always endorsed by local officials, or indeed that it was 
economically literate. 55  As Krivoshein’s words imply, Russian economic policy in 
Turkestan was driven by autarkic concerns quite alien to the British (for whom Free Trade 
                                                        
51  A. I. Knize, V. I. Yuferev, “Khlopkovodstvo,” Aziatskaya Rossiya, vol. 2: Zemlya i 
Khozyaistvo (St. Petersburg, 1914), p. 278.  
52 See Z. D. Kastel'skaya, Iz Istorii Turkestanskogo Kraya (Moscow, 1980), pp. 51–66; M. I. 
Veksel'man, Rossiiskii monopolisticheskii i inostrannyi kapital v Srednei Azii (Konets XIX – 
nachalo XXv.) (Tashkent, 1987), pp. 3–4, 9–29.  
53 A. M. Eckstein, “Is there a ‘Hobson-Lenin Thesis’ on Late Nineteenth-Century Colonial 
Expansion?” Economic History Review 44, no. 2 (1991), pp. 306–307.  
54  A. V. Krivoshein, Zapiska Glavnoupravlyaushchego Zemledeliem i Zemleustroistvom o 
Poezdke v Turkestanskii Krai v 1912 godu (St. Petersburg, 1912), pp. 7–8, quoted in David 
Mackenzie, “Turkestan’s significance to Russia,” Russian Review 33, no. 2 (1974), p. 182.  
55 A. Woeikoff, a government agronomist, in Le Turkestan Russe (Paris, 1914), pp. 254–265 
complains that Russian military officials in Turkestan obstructed the spread of cotton 
cultivation for fear it would cause social unrest. This is borne out in Muriel Joffe’s excellent 
article “Autocracy, Capitalism and Empire: The Politics of Irrigation,” Russian Review 54, no. 3 
(1995), pp. 365–388 which details how a scheme by Moscow mill-owners to acquire their own 
large cotton-growing estates in Turkestan and employ local labour (rather than relying on cotton 
grown on peasant smallholdings, as 90% of it was) was stymied by local administrative 
opposition.  
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was a sacred mantra), as the Russians sought to make their empire as independent as 
possible of imports of American cotton. If we look more carefully at Tsarist cotton policy, 
it becomes clear that it was only through considerable fiscal engineering that Turkestan 
cotton could compete with American imports on price: it was given tax breaks which did 
not reflect the real value of water used in its production,56 and above all the state imposed 
heavy duties on imported cotton, rising to 3 roubles 15 kopeks per pood by 1894, which 
effectively protected Turkestan cotton from foreign competition and acted as an indirect 
subsidy.57 The net effect of Russian policies may have been to drive up the price of raw 
cotton and enrich Turkestan merchants and farmers, not the Moscow textile barons.  
Perhaps then it is in the fiscal and economic policies of Empire, rather than in 
cultural questions about Russia’s “hybridity” or administrative and legal distinctions 
between metropole and colony, that the real distinctiveness of Russian Imperialism begins 
to emerge. Although all European Empires had unprofitable colonies (that, after all, was 
the substance of J. A. Hobson’s stinging attack on the “New Imperialism”),58 and all 
mounted conquests for strategic rather than economic reasons, perhaps only in the Russian 
Empire, and subsequently the Soviet Union, did the metropole so consistently subsidise the 
colonial periphery.59 Together with this, I would argue that the Russian colonial state was 
distinctively weak. If, as Elvin has suggested, one common characteristic of European 
modernity in particular is its “ability to create power,”60 then the Russian empire did this 
less effectively than its western European counterparts. It could project crude military 
power, but it could not control or remake local society effectively: its institutions were too 
weak and over-stretched, its knowledge of the societies it conquered too faulty and 
superficial. Daniel Brower has argued that the failure to move from a rudimentary (and 
separate) military regime to an integrated civilian one in Turkestan was part of the Russian 
Empire’s wider failure to modernise, which led it to collapse under the stresses of war.61 
                                                        
56 Graf K. K. Pahlen, Otchet, Revizuyushchago, po Vysochaishemu Poveleniyu, Turkestanskogo 
Kraya, vol. 5: Nalogi i Poshliny (St. Petersburg, 1909), p. 75.  
57 S. N. Abashin, “Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe i demograficheskie razvitie,” in Abashin, Arapov and 
Bekmakhanova, eds., Tsentral'naya Aziya v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii (Moscow, 2008), p. 147.  
58 See Imperialism, A Study, Chaps. 2‒3.  
59 See Ekaterina Pravilova, Finansy imperii: den'gi i vlast' v politike Rossii na natsional'nykh 
okrainakh, 1801‒1917 (Moscow, 2006); For an interesting point of comparison, see Avner 
Offer “The British Empire, 1870–1914: A Waste of Money?” The Economic History Review 46, 
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over.  
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Arguably the Russian empire was under-governed everywhere, and only had a very 
fragmented and contradictory modernising project even in its European heartlands.62 At the 
periphery, in Turkestan, it was a very shallow regime, which did not penetrate deeply into 
local society and was often manipulated by local elites in ways its officials deplored but 
could not prevent. As Tomohiko Uyama has shown for Semirechie, conscription and 
religious conversion, two vital tools of a modern state seeking to re-make its citizens, were 
only pursued half-heartedly, always tempered by the fear of provoking a revolt – a fear that 
turned out to be justified in 1916, when the ukaz introducing conscription into labour 
battalions provoked a widespread revolt and revealed the shallow roots of the Tsarist 
regime in the region, as well as its latent capacity for violence.63 Whilst the limits of 
colonial power in other European non-settler colonies have long been recognised by 
historians of Empire,64 the grand projects of enumeration and categorisation in censuses 
and law codes, of the creation of “colonial knowledge” which many now consider to have 
been as important as military might in securing European domination,65 were very under-
developed in Russia.66 
Thus a closer examination of Russia, that pre-modern, land-based, dynastic empire, 
reveals real differences, but also certain unexpected similarities to “modern” British 
maritime Imperialism, albeit sometimes in rather diluted form. This suggests to me that, 
rather than broad categorisations of Imperialism, with sharp distinctions between modern 
and pre-modern, “Asiatic” and European, all Imperialisms should be seen as existing on a 
continuum, with subtly shifting grades in between them, from Austria-Hungary at one end 
of the spectrum to, say, the Gilbert & Ellis islands at the other, with different parts of 
different empires located at different points on this spectrum in between. Thus in 
geographical, cultural and conceptual terms Russian Turkestan and British India can be 
seen as close neighbours; the Ukraine would be distant from the Gold Coast, but closer to 
                                                        
62 Sviatoslav Kaspe, “Imperial Political Culture and Modernization in the Second Half of the 
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Ireland, Austrian Ruthenia or Ottoman Rumelia, whilst Siberia and Canada could also rub 
shoulders. Sometimes the similarity will be a product of geographical proximity or 
something as basic as climate and landscape; sometimes it will derive from shared cultural 
characteristics amongst subject populations, such as Islam; sometimes it will be found in 
the economic relationship between metropole and colony; and sometimes Imperial ruling 
elites and subject peoples will be actively borrowing ideas from each other, as the Russians 
did repeatedly from the British in particular.67 Alongside these similarities, there will also, 
of course, be differences, but in neither case should we assume that these are simply a 
product of the policies of the rulers. The nature of Imperial control is determined as much, 
if not more, by the circumstances within the colony as it is by any particularities of 
metropolitan politics, culture and economics. What this means in turn is that, before 
attempting to make sweeping generalisations about the nature of “Russian” or “British,” 
“French” or indeed “modern” Imperialism, we should look carefully at the specifics of 
different regions and different colonies, and compare these. The literature on British and 
French Imperialism is already rich enough to make this a simple enough task, and that on 
Russian Imperialism is rapidly growing in depth and quality, to a point where it is no 
longer defensible to argue that the Russian empire was sui generis, “Eurasian,” “uniquely 
assimilationist” or otherwise qualitatively different from other modern European empires. 
Russia as a whole was unique – as unique as any other empire, but no more – and her 
various regions, borderlands and colonies, if considered separately, can indeed be found to 
fit wider patterns of European Imperial expansion and be examined comparatively with 
profit.  
I would conclude with the observation that, without claiming to be able to define 
“modernity,” perhaps one thing which set the “modern” empires apart, was their 
heightened awareness of each other, and consequent global rivalry. This is connected to the 
sense of “common temporal awareness” which I referred to earlier: the emergence of a 
common sense of time, and a single way of measuring it, both in terms of the daily routine 
and in terms of development – the post-Enlightenment concepts of “backwardness” or 
“progress.” Previous empires had of course been rivals, had fought with each other, spied 
on each other, sought to steal each other’s technological advances: but they do not seem to 
have felt that they were part of some sort of gigantic pseudo-Darwinian contest, where the 
weakest and most “backward” would go to the wall and only the strongest and most 
“progressive” would survive. Instead their historians seem to have thought in terms of 
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cycles, of rise and fall, not of “advance.”68 Certainly, it was only in the 19th century that 
Empires had accurate maps on which their territory and that of their rivals was clearly 
demarcated and painted in different colours to show who had control of the largest slices of 
the global pie. This, I would tentatively suggest, is a “modern” phenomenon, and one in 
which Russia shared, although it is perhaps equally applicable to all modern states and 
nationalities, and not just to Empires. I cannot really say how “modern” Russian 
Imperialism was – but I hope I have suggested that it was no less, and no more “modern,” 
than that of the other 19th-century empires.  
                                                        
68 In my limited experience, in any case: certainly this seems to be true of both Polybius and Ibn 
Khaldun.  
